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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Payments made in full and final settlement have on several occasions 
presented interpretative difficulties for our judiciary,1 as will become apparent 
from this case discussion.2 The Supreme Court of Appeal3 reversed the 
judgments of the trial court and the appeal court (full bench of the Cape 
Provincial Division) which were in favour of the creditor.4 In such cases, the 
essential enquiry is whether an agreement of compromise exists. A transactio 
or compromise (in the form of a legal agreement) exists where the relevant 
parties agree to settle previously disputed or uncertain obligations.5 Like any 
other agreement, a compromise is based on the contractual rules of offer and 
acceptance.6
                                            
* BA (Law), LLB (Natal), LLM (UKZN), Senior Lecturer in Private Law, University of South 
Africa. 
1  Several judgments dealing with this problematic aspect of the law of contract have been 
reversed on appeal, see eg, Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644; Van Breukelen v Van 
Breukelen 1966 2 SA 285 (A); Blackie Swart Argitekte v Van Heerden 1986 1 SA 238 (A); 
Patterson Exhibitions v Knights Advertising & Marketing 1991 3 SA 523 (A); Kei Brick & 
Tile v AM Construction 1996 1 SA 150 (E); and RCG Trade & Finance v Garstang 2002 
JDR 0451 (W). 
2  This discussion is based on the case, Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing v Kingtex 
Marketing 2008 3 SA 327 (SCA). 
3  Hereafter the SCA. 
4  Hereafter the CPD. 
5  Karson v Minister of Public Works 1996 1 SA 887 (E) 893F-H; Christie Law of Contract 
455-456; and Sharrock Business Transactions Law 221-222. 
6  See eg, Patterson Exhibitions v Knights Advertising & Marketing 1991 3 SA 523 (A) 528; 
Absa Bank v Van De Vyver 2002 4 SA 397 (SCA) 402A-F; Christie, supra n 5, 459; 
Sharrock, supra n 5, 221; and Zeffertt 1972 SALJ 38. These references are consistent with 
the case under discussion, Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing v Kingtex Marketing 
2008 3 SA 327 (SCA), and overrides the decision taken in Louw v Granowsky 1960 2 SA 
637 (SWA) 641E-G that there is no need for the debtor to prove that a contract of 
compromise exists, if the creditor retains and appropriates the payment made in full and 
final settlement.  
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The focus of this discussion relates to the recent SCA judgment in Be Bop A 
Lula Manufacturing & Printing CC v Kingtex Marketing (Pty) Ltd.7
1. an intended offer of compromise exists; or 
 The first 
material enquiry in this case wherein the debtor delivered the cheque payment 
to the creditor (in full and final settlement of the account), is whether: 
 
2. did the debtor merely8
 
 intend to make payment towards an admitted 
liability. 
Critical to the above enquiry is the fact that the debtor delivered the precise 
amount it believed it owed to the creditor. In this specific context,9 it was 
reasoned by the court in Karson v Minister of Public Works10 that it is easier to 
find that a debtor made payment towards an admitted liability when a debtor 
delivers the precise amount he believes he owes the creditor. However, such a 
conclusion can never be arrived at easily, since in such circumstances an 
intended offer of compromise could exist.11
                                            
7  Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing v Kingtex Marketing 2008 3 SA 327 (SCA), 
(hereafter the Be Bop (SCA) case). 
8  The importance of this word is expressed in 2.2 of the text. 
9  For examples where the debtor delivers the precise amount that he/it believed was owing 
to the creditor, see eg, Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644; Tractor & Excavator Spares v Lucas 
J Botha 1966 2 SA 740 (T); Andy’s Electrical v Laurie Sykes 1979 3 SA 341 (N); Kei Brick 
& Tile v AM Construction 1996 1 SA 150 (E); Karson v Minister of Public Works 1996 
(1)SA 887 (E); and the Be Pop (SCA) case. 
10  See Karson v Minister of Public Works 1996 1 SA 887 (ECD) 895G-H, (hereafter the 
Karson case). 
11  For cases that illustrate the point that delivering payment for the precise amount the debtor 
believes he owes the creditor (in full and final settlement) does not preclude the prospect 
that an offer of compromise could exist, see eg, Van Breukelen v Van Breukelen 1966 2 
SA 285 (A) 290D; Tractor & Excavator Spares v Lucas J Botha 1966 2 SA 740 (T); and 
Andy’s Electrical v Laurie Sykes 1979 3 SA 341(N).  
 If an offer of compromise exists, the 
second stage of the enquiry is whether or not acceptance of the said offer has 
been effected, and whilst this enquiry is not the material focus of this case 
discussion, it will be addressed briefly. 
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2 Legal principles (background) 
2.1 Consequences of an offer of compromise in comparison with 
payment of an admitted liability 
It is significant to note the consequences that follow for both debtor and creditor 
from the outcome of whether or not an offer of compromise exists, in contrast 
with a mere payment towards the debtor’s admitted liability.  
1. If the debtor’s payment constitutes an offer of compromise (referred 
to as animo contrahendi),12 which the creditor accepts, the creditor 
generally cannot make any further claim against the debtor.13 It does 
not help the creditor to accept the offer of compromise "without 
prejudice" or to add terms and conditions to the debtors' offer of 
compromise,14 the reason being that the offer of compromise (made 
in full and final settlement) is generally accepted based on the 
implied (if not express) condition that the creditor abandons the 
balance of his claim.15
2. If the amount delivered merely represents payment of the debtor’s 
admitted liability (referred to as animo solvendi)
  
16
                                            
12  See Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 654-655; and Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & 
Printing v Kingtex Marketing 2006 6 SA 379 (C) 392H-I. In the latter case it should be 
noted that the citation is different from the Be Bop (SCA) case. 
13  See Odendaal v Du Plessis 1918 AD 470, 475-478; Neville v Plasket 1935 TPD 115, 120; 
Turgin v Atlantic Clothing Manufacturers 1954 3 SA 527 (T) 532G-H; Van Breukelen v Van 
Breukelen 1966 2 SA 285 (A); Tractor & Excavator Spares v Lucas J Botha 1966 2 SA 740 
(T) 743C-E; Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41 (N) 48H-51A; Andy’s Electrical v 
Laurie Sykes 1979 3 SA 341 (N) 343A-C; Absa Bank v Van De Vyver 2002 4 SA 397 
(SCA) 402B-F; RCG Trade & Finance v Garstang 2002 JDR 0451 (W) 30; Kerr Principles 
of Law of Contract 536; Christie, supra n 5, 460; Sharrock, supra n 5, 223 and Zeffertt, 
supra n 6, 41. However, for limited circumstances when the creditor may retain the 
debtor’s payment (that is accompanied by the offer of compromise) and still legitimately 
claim the balance owing, see the cases referred to in (n 105) and Burt v National Bank of 
South Africa 1921 AD 59. See also McLennan 2002 SALJ 686, where the author warns 
that the banking of the cheque by the creditor will not always provide conclusive proof of 
acceptance of an offer of compromise.   
14  Andy’s Electrical v Laurie Sykes 1979 3 SA 341 (N) 343A-B. 
15  See in general, the references in n 13.  
16  Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 654-655; and Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing v 
Kingtex Marketing 2006 6 SA 379 (C) 392H-I. 
 the creditor can 
retain and deposit the monies received and thereafter sue the debtor 
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for the balance of his claim.17 This is the case irrespective of 
whether the debtor expressed to the creditor that such payment is 
made in full and final settlement of the claim.18 In this context, the 
creditor can legitimately regard these words as being pro non 
scripto,19 the reason being that the debtor cannot include the 
condition that the creditor’s retention of the payment of the admitted 
liability finally settles the balance of the creditor’s claim as well, if 
such a condition was not intended in the contract between the debtor 
and the creditor, or implied in law.20
Therefore, whether the payment constitutes an intended offer of compromise or 
mere payment towards an admitted liability is crucial, due to the consequences 
that flow from this enquiry. Furthermore, where there is doubt or uncertainty 
whether or not the debtor establishes that an offer of compromise exists, the 
contra proferentem rule will apply. In terms of this rule the construction 
unfavourable to the debtor will prevail, as he had the power to make his 
intention clear when he made the payment.
 
21
2.2 Admitting liability for a specific amount and delivering payment 
accordingly 
 
 
In the Be Bop (SCA) case, the debtor admitted liability for a specific amount 
and delivered payment accordingly (in full and final settlement) to the creditor. 
                                            
17  See eg, Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 649-650; Karson v Minister of Public Works 1996 
1 SA 887 (E) 895F-I; Kei Brick & Tile v AM Construction 1996 1 SA 150 (E) 158A-B; Absa 
Bank v Van De Vyver 2002 4 SA 397 (SCA) 404A-B; Kerr, supra n 13, 536; and Christie, 
supra n 5, 458; Zeffertt, supra n 6, 41-42.  
18  See eg, Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 649-651; and Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 
1966 4 SA 41 (N) 46D-H. 
19  See Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 649; Cecil Jacobs v Macleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41 
(N) 46G-H; and Zeffertt, supra n 6, 41-42.  
20  See Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 650; and Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 
41 (N) 46F-G. 
21  See eg, Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 655; Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 
41 (N) 47A-B; Andy’s Electrical v Laurie Sykes 1979 3 SA 341 (N) 345A-B; Karson v 
Minister of Public Works 1996 1 SA 887 (E) 896C-D; Absa Bank v Van De Vyver 2002 4 
SA 397 (SCA) 405C-D; Christie, supra n 5, 457-459; and Sharrock, supra n 5, 222. In Kei 
Brick & Tile v AM Construction 1996 1 SA 150 (E) the majority judgment reasoned that the 
debtor’s words, “ter vereffening van die rekening” (par 152E) meant “in payment of the 
account”, which did not mean “in full settlement” (par 157C-D), and in the context of the 
debtor’s letter addressed to the creditor it was interpreted contra proferentem (par 157C-
G).  
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Before the facts of the Be Bop (SCA) case are set out, it is relevant to consider 
the approach previously taken by our judiciary, to assess whether an offer of 
compromise exists or if this is a mere payment of an admitted liability, in the 
context dealt with in this section of this article. 
 
In Andy’s Electrical v Laurie Sykes (Pty) Ltd22 and Tractor & Excavator Spares 
(Pty) Ltd v Lucas J Botha (Pty) Ltd,23 the debtor (in both cases) admitted 
liability for a specific amount and delivered this amount to the creditor. In both 
cases, the Natal Provincial Division24 and the Transvaal Provincial Division25 
respectively found that an offer of compromise existed. Both of these cases 
therefore highlight the point that payment of an admitted debt (for a specific 
amount believed to be owing by the debtor) can be accompanied by an offer of 
compromise. This point is justified as there is no bar precluding a person from 
offering to compromise a claim, where he admits liability for a specific amount 
and makes payment accordingly. Therefore, in the Andy’s Electrical case 
Didcott J justifiably criticised judgments that simplistically, “distinguished offers 
of compromise from payments of admitted debts, as if the one sort of 
transaction necessarily excluded the other".26
However, there are certain dicta (when read in isolation) in some cases which 
may tend to confuse and incline a reader to think that payment of an admitted 
debt excludes the possibility that an offer of compromise could nevertheless still 
exist.
 
 
27
                                            
22  Andy’s Electrical v Laurie Sykes 1979 3 SA 341 (N). (Hereafter the Andy’s Electrical case).  
23 Tractor & Excavator Spares v Lucas J Botha 1966 2 SA 740 (T). (Hereafter the Tractor 
case). 
24  Hereafter the NPD. 
25  Hereafter the TPD. 
26  Par 344B. 
27  See eg, the Andy’s Electrical case (at par 346A-B) where Didcott J stated that such dicta 
are contained in Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 649-650. See the dicta also in Cecil 
Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41 (N) (at par 46F, 48C-D and 48G-H) which create a 
similar perception when read in isolation. In the latter case, a material enquiry in the 
circumstances appears to be whether the debtor admitted the precise extent of his liability 
in monetary terms and made payment accordingly. These instances could create the 
perception that if this is the case and the enquiry ends here, it may automatically constitute 
mere payment of an admitted liability.  
 In the Karson case, the amount paid by the debtor represented the 
precise capital balance, which the debtor conceded to be the extent of his 
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admitted indebtedness. This fact appears to be the overwhelming factor that 
easily persuaded the court to conclude that payment of an admitted liability was 
intended, without practically considering whether this admission of liability was 
nevertheless accompanied by an offer of compromise.28
In Absa Bank v Van De Vyver
 In this context the 
approach taken in the Karson case is hereby respectfully criticised, and later in 
this discussion the court’s actual finding that mere payment of an admitted debt 
was intended will be addressed. 
 
29 there are also certain dicta that create the 
perception that payment towards what the debtor believes he owes the creditor 
may exclude the possibility that an offer of compromise could exist. It was 
reasoned by the court (in the Absa Bank case) that an offer of compromise 
could exist even when there is an admission of liability on the part of the 
debtor.30 The ambit of this reasoning is broad enough to include situations that 
could result in the existence of an offer of compromise when the debtor delivers 
the precise amount he believes he owes to the creditor. However, the approach 
of the SCA does not positively create this perception. In the Absa Bank case, 
the debtor delivered R180 000.00 to the creditor, and the central focus of the 
SCA (in the entire judgment) was that the “inference from the proved facts 
cannot demonstrate that R180 000.00 was the extent of the estate’s undeniable 
liability at the relevant time".31
                                            
28  See the Karson case, at par 895G-896A, and at par 895G-H, where it is reasoned that it is 
easier (emphasis added) to conclude that mere payment of an admitted debt is made, 
“particularly so where the amount tendered is in respect of an admitted liability (which is 
here the case, viz the admitted R108 000 of unpaid capital) as, if a debtor delivers to his 
creditor payment of his admitted liability accompanied by a statement that it is paid in full 
settlement, the creditor is not bound to accept the payment as such but may retain it". 
Thereafter (at par 895I-896A) the court reiterates and places “considerable importance” on 
the fact that that the sum of R108 000 was admitted by the debtor to be owing to the 
creditor. Following from this line of reasoning, the court then simplistically concludes that 
payment is made towards an admitted liability (see par 896A). The effect of this reasoning 
is that the court concluded that payment was made towards an admitted liability simply 
because the debtor admitted that he was indebted to the creditor in the sum of 
R108,000.00 and he delivered this payment to the creditor. It has already been pointed out 
that admitting liability for a certain amount which is consistent with the debtor’s payment is 
not (in isolation) conclusive that an offer of compromise does not exist. 
29  See Absa Bank v Van De Vyver 2002 4 SA 397 (SCA) 405C, 405H-J, 406A-B, and 406I-
407A. (Hereafter the Absa Bank case). 
30  Par 18. 
 As a result, the SCA concluded that an offer of 
31  See par 21. See also, at par 18, where the SCA referred to the Patterson Exhibition v 
Knights Advertising & Marketing 1991 3 SA 523 (A) case, by highlighting that the debtor in 
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compromise was intended by the debtor.32 However, the perception created by 
the SCA is that if the said R180 000.00 demonstrates the debtor’s undeniable 
liability, the conclusion could automatically be that payment was made towards 
an admitted liability33 and not for the purpose of compromising the creditor’s 
claim. It has already been discussed hereinabove that such a conclusion will 
not automatically follow in these circumstances, as an offer of compromise 
could still exist.34
Contrary to this view, the court in the Be Bop (SCA) case
   
 
35 relied on the 
reasoning of the SCA in the Absa Bank case36 as authority for the principle that 
admission of liability for a certain amount is no bar to excluding the possibility 
that an offer of compromise could still exist. However, it is respectfully 
reiterated that the Absa Bank case did not positively create this perception. 
Furthermore, the justification of the court in the Be Bop (SCA) case37 relies on 
dicta in the Absa Bank case38 that do not directly refer to an admission of 
liability in a certain or precise amount (on the part of the debtor). Instead these 
dicta refer to examples wherein all liability is denied,39 or where some liability is 
admitted without admitting how much,40 or where some liability is admitted 
without admitting that the payment offered represented the admitted 
indebtedness.41
                                                                                                                               
that case did not state that “the payment offered represented the admitted indebtedness", 
and at par 21 the SCA again reiterated that “[n]o evidence and no calculations serve to 
show, however, that the sum of R180 000 offered by the respondent in the letter in issue 
corresponded closely, or even as a rough approximation, to what the overall indebtedness 
on the two accounts would have been", and at par 22 the SCA reasoned that what the 
debtor’s letter “plainly does not say is that liability in the sum of R180 000 is admitted or 
that this represents the limit of the estate’s indebtedness", and finally at par 25, after 
stating that the letters addressed by the debtor to the creditor did not show that the sum of 
R180 000 represented the debtors “view of the estate’s indebtedness or that indebtedness 
in that amount", the court reasoned that an offer of compromise was intended.  
32  See par 25. 
33  This inference is drawn when consideration is given to the probe of the SCA, as is set out 
in (n 31) above. 
34  See content relating to above (n 22 to n 26). Also see the Andy’s Electrical case; the 
Tractor case; and the Van Breukelen case, at 290D. 
35  Par 11. 
36  Par 15-18 in the Absa Bank case. 
37  Par 11. 
38  Par 15-18 in the Absa Bank case. 
39  Par 15 in the Absa Bank case. 
40  Par 18 in the Absa Bank case. 
41  Ibid. 
 In all of these circumstances, especially the latter, it appears 
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that the court in the Absa Bank case did not refer to the scenario wherein the 
debtor admits that a specific amount is owing to the creditor. Therefore, it is 
respectfully submitted that it was not appropriate for the court in the Be Bop 
(SCA) case to utilise the Absa Bank case to illustrate the principle that 
“admitted liability in a certain amount is no bar to the proposal being construed 
as an offer of compromise".42 The more appropriate authorities to illustrate this 
principle are the Tractor case, the Andy’s Electrical case and the Van 
Breukelen v Van Breukelen case.43
At times the approach of our judiciary to this issue is a concern, and in this 
regard it is respectfully submitted that a basic oversight may sometimes be the 
manner in which the wording of the enquiry is formulated (to establish if an offer 
of compromise exists). In the Be Bop (CPD) case the enquiry set out was 
whether the debtor intended “an offer of compromise or as an offer to pay what 
the debtor believes he owes the creditor".
  
 
44 In the Absa Bank case, a similar 
enquiry was formulated, “whether the payment made is intended to effect a 
compromise or pay an admitted liability".45 With an enquiry of this nature it 
seems all too simplistic to exclude the possibility that an offer of compromise 
exists once the debtor admits that a specific amount is owing to the creditor and 
he makes payment accordingly. This type of enquiry creates the perception that 
one transaction (admission of liability for a specific amount accompanied by 
payment) excludes the other (the possibility that an offer of compromise could 
nevertheless still exist), which is a perception Didcott J rejected and warned 
against in the Andy’s Electrical case.46
To allow for the debtor to intend an offer of compromise despite also making 
precise payment towards an admitted debt, it appears that the insertion of the 
word "merely" (into the judicial enquiry) has the potential to reverse the 
  
 
                                            
42  The Be Bop (SCA) case, par 11. 
43  Van Breukelen v Van Breukelen 1966 2 SA 285 (A) 290D. (Hereafter the Van Breukelen 
case). 
44  Par 42. 
45  Par 16. 
46  See par 344B; see also the Van Breukelen case, at 290D; and Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 
644, at 649, where it is reasoned that a compromise could be intended even where liability 
to the extent of the tender is admitted. 
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perception just alluded to. Zeffertt47 wisely suggests that the enquiry be 
“whether an offer of compromise has been made or payment of an amount 
which the debtor merely48
3 Facts and decision 
 regards as reflecting the extent of his indebtedness". 
Accordingly, if the debtor wants to make payment towards his precise admitted 
indebtedness (evidencing admission of liability for a specific amount), and he 
also intends to compromise the claim, he is not merely doing the former. He is 
doing more than that. An intended offer of compromise could therefore 
nevertheless still exist. This observation should serve as an appropriate starting 
point for our judiciary when presented with disputes of this nature. 
 
There appears to be theoretical consensus that it is not sufficient to preclude 
the possibility that an offer of compromise may still exist even when payment of 
a specific amount believed to be owing is delivered by the debtor to the 
creditor. However, our judiciary have not at times iterated this perception. 
Against this background, it is necessary to discuss whether the court in the Be 
Bop (SCA) case gave recognition to this principle.  
 
 
In evaluating the factual evidence in this case, the essential focus of 
interpretation centred on the written correspondences exchanged between the 
debtor and the creditor. These correspondences contain the pertinent facts 
relevant to this discussion, which are as follows:  
1. In response to the creditor’s claim for R229 846.07, the debtor sent 
the creditor a written correspondence (dated 19 February 2002) 
                                            
47  Zeffertt, supra n 6, 48; see also eg, the Karson case at par 895C-D, where reference is 
made to the word “merely” in the formulated enquiry; the Andy’s Electrical case at par 
346A where the word “mere” is utilised; Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41 (N) 
(at par 46C) where the words “to do more than” have a similar effect to the word “merely"; 
Kei Brick & Tile v AM Construction 1996 1 SA 150 (E) (at par 157E-F), where the word 
“merely” is utilised; and RCG Trade & Finance v Garstang 2002 JDR 0451 (W) 24, where 
it is stated “that they constituted an offer of compromise and not merely the evidence of an 
intention to pay". 
48  Own emphasis. 
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advising the creditor that certain garments it delivered were defective, 
for which a credit request was made, in the sum of R122 649,18.  
2. A second letter dated 19 February 2002 was addressed by the debtor 
to the creditor, described as a ‘Final Reconciliation’ correspondence, 
in which the debtor deducted the amount of its credit request 
(R122,649,18), from the capital amount (R229 846,07) claimed by 
the creditor, leaving a final balance (according to the debtor) of R107 
196,89 (thereby acknowledging the precise amount believed to be 
owing). 
3. On 19 February 2002 the debtor delivered a cheque (dated 28 
February 2002) to the creditor for R107 196,89. 
4. The said cheque which evidenced the words "full and final settlement 
of account" on the front of the cheque was paid by the bank on 28 
February 2002, after an employee of the creditor (who was following 
the creditor’s banking policy) deposited the cheque (for special 
clearance) into the creditor’s bank account.  
5. On 1 March 2002, the creditor (through its attorneys) sent a letter (by 
fax) to the debtor (dated 1 March 2002) advising the debtor, as 
follows: 
5.1 The creditor disagreed with the debtor’s credit request. 
5.2 The creditor does not accept the cheque issued by the debtor, 
as payment in full and final settlement of the account, and if the 
debtor disagrees it should stop payment on the cheque, 
otherwise the payment will be placed in the creditor’s attorneys 
trust account, pending the outcome of the dispute. 
6. The debtor then addressed a letter to the creditor, (dated 4 March 
2002), advising the creditor, that: 
6.1 The creditor’s letter dated 1 March 2002 was received by it only 
on 4 March 2002. 
6.2 The bank advised it (the debtor) that it was too late to stop 
payment on the cheque. 
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6.3 In the circumstances, by depositing the cheque, the creditor 
accepted the condition that the cheque payment was made in 
full and final settlement of the account. 
6.4 The deduction of the costs (relating to the credit request) was 
not a bogus claim. 
6.5 Should the matter still be pursued by the creditor, a 
counterclaim will be forthcoming by the debtor, for a loss of 
profit incurred by the debtor, because the creditor failed to 
deliver 20 000 T-shirts timeously. 
7. The result was that the creditor placed the payment in its attorney’s 
trust account, and at some stage a portion of this amount was 
appropriated in favour of the creditor. 
 
The court in the Be Bop (SCA) case had to decide two issues. Firstly, whether 
or not the two letters (dated 19 February 2002) and the cheque payment sent 
by the debtor to the creditor constituted an offer of compromise. Secondly, if an 
offer of compromise existed, whether or not the depositing of the cheque into 
the creditor’s bank account, accompanied by the subsequent retention and 
partial appropriation of a portion of the said cheque payment in favour of the 
creditor, constituted acceptance of the offer of compromise. On both accounts, 
the court in the Be Bop (SCA) case reversed the findings of the court in the 
CPD, by ruling firstly that an offer of compromise existed, and secondly that 
acceptance of the offer was effected (although it was reasoned that actual 
consensus may have been absent).  
 
 
4 Analysis of the decision that an offer of compromise existed    
It is submitted that this decision made by the court in the Be Bop (SCA) case 
was correct, for the following reasons: 
 
In the Be Bop (SCA) case, the debtor admitted the precise monetary extent of 
its indebtedness, and accordingly made payment to the creditor (in full and final 
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settlement). This fact itself is not conclusive that an offer of compromise is 
automatically excluded.49 The issue then arises as to whether, despite this fact, 
the debtor nevertheless intended to compromise the claim.50 Given the 
complex and technical nature of this enquiry, Didcott J (in the Andy’s Electrical 
case) appropriately reasoned that the objective should be to determine the real 
purpose of the payment.51 In essence, the learned judge summed up the 
enquiry to be whether the debtor intended to settle the whole claim by paying a 
particular amount, or whether payment was made with the intention that the 
rest of the claim remains in issue.52 If the real purpose of the payment is to 
settle the whole dispute, an offer of compromise is intended and “not the mere 
discharge of an acknowledged liability".53 In the Be Bop (SCA) case the facts 
are similar to the facts in the Andy’s Electrical case, as the debtor (after 
reconstructing the creditor’s demand or statement of account) admitted owing a 
specific amount, and paid this amount to the creditor (in full settlement). 
Subsequent to establishing that the real purpose of the payment was to settle 
the whole dispute, the court in the Andy’s Electrical case concluded that an 
offer of compromise was intended by the debtor. With reference to the Be Bop 
(SCA) case, it is difficult to accept that the debtor did not intend to settle the 
whole dispute and that its intention was that the rest of the claim should remain 
in issue. In addressing the disputed amount owing, the debtor refers to the 
latter of the two letters (dated 19 February 2002) sent to the creditor as a “final 
reconciliation”.54 This reference is supplemented by the insertion of the words 
“full and final settlement of account”55
                                            
49  See eg, The Andy’s Electrical case, par 343G-H; The Tractor case, 743A; The Van 
Breukelen case 1966 2 SA 285 (A) 290D; Kei Brick & Tile v AM Construction 1996 1 SA 
150 (E) 160A-B, (Minority Judgment); and see discussion in 2.2 above. 
50  The Andy’s Electrical case, par 343G-H. 
51  Par 343H-344A. 
52  Par 344C; see also Kei Brick & Tile v AM Construction 1996 1 SA 150 (E) 161E-F, 
(Minority Judgment).  
53  The Andy’s Electrical case, at par 346A. 
54  The Be Bop (SCA) case, at par 2, par 4, par 11; and see 3.2 above.  
55  The Be Bop (SCA) case, at par 11. 
 on the cheque payment which 
accompanied the said letter. The repetitive use of the word "final" (in the 
context of the content of both letters dated 19 February 2002 and the cheque 
payment) indicates that the debtor intends to bring finality to the whole dispute, 
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without intending that the rest of the claim remains in issue.56 Therefore, it is 
apt that the court in the Be Bop (CPD) case mentioned that the debtor 
considered its payment (in full and final settlement) to be made in favour of a 
“final balance".57 Hence it is difficult to accept the reasoning of the court in the 
Be Bop (CPD) case that no indications of a compromise were evident in the 
letters dated 19 February 2002.58 That the debtor intended to compromise the 
claim and bring finality to the whole dispute is further supplemented by the fact 
that the debtor was willing to forfeit a claim for loss of profits for the late delivery 
of certain goods (by the creditor), which claim subsequently proved to be 
successful.59 The decision of the court in the Be Bop (SCA) case was therefore 
correct.60 The Tractor case also serves as a justification for the decision in the 
Be Bop (SCA) case.61
In the Be Bop (SCA) case, when the creditor advised the debtor (in its letter 
dated 1 March 2002) that payment was not accepted in full and final 
settlement,
   
 
62
                                            
56  See also Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41 (N) at 48E-G, where the use of the 
words, “in order to reach finality” is interpreted to bring an end to the dispute, if the creditor 
chooses to retain the amount delivered by the debtor. 
57  Par 9. 
58  Par 44. 
59  See par 11 in the Be Bop (CPD) case, where the effect of the debtor’s letter (dated 4 
March 2002) addressed to the creditor is that if finality is not reached with the debtor’s 
payment (to settle the whole dispute), a counterclaim will be pursued by the debtor for loss 
of profits for late delivery costs. The inference is that the counterclaim will be forfeited if 
finality is reached with the debtor’s payment. This was not a bogus counterclaim as the 
debtor was successful with this counterclaim in the court a quo, after the court a quo found 
that an agreement of compromise did not exist (see par 1 and par 4 in the Be Bop (CPD) 
case). This successful counterclaim in the court a quo was not appealed by the creditor in 
the CPD (see par 1 and par 4 in the Be Bop (CPD) case). It was therefore a sound claim 
that the debtor was willing to forfeit, thereby indicating an inclination towards 
compromising the creditor’s claim. 
60  See par 11, where the SCA reasons that an offer of compromise was intended by the 
debtor.  
61  In the Tractor case (at 743C) the court concluded that an offer of compromise existed, 
after reasoning that the debtor placed the disputed amounts in issue in the context of 
intending to discharge his entire liability in full and final settlement. Similarly in the Be Bop 
(SCA) case the debtor placed the disputed amounts in issue (in both its letters dated 19 
February 2002) with the intention to discharge its entire liability, by sending the said letters 
and the cheque in full and final settlement to the creditor.  
62  Par 5. 
 the debtor responded by advising the creditor that the depositing 
of the cheque gave effect to the condition that the creditor accepted the 
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payment as full and final settlement of the claim.63 Whilst the said advice by the 
debtor was given to the creditor soon after the delivery of the cheque payment, 
it is nevertheless relevant to assist in establishing the intention of the debtor. 
This submission is made as it was reasoned (by the court) in the Harris case 
that such advice (which is made after delivery of the payment) on the part of the 
debtor would have “meant that the payment was in full settlement of the 
plaintiff’s claim",64
To support its finding that an offer of compromise was not intended by the 
debtor, the court in the Be Bop (CPD) case emphasised that if the debtor was 
serious about compromising the claim, it would not have attempted to stop 
payment on the cheque.
 thereby favouring the existence of an offer of compromise. 
 
65 However, in the Be Bop (SCA) case the court 
appropriately reasoned that this attempt by the debtor had no bearing on the 
fact that the cheque and the two letters addressed to the creditor (dated 19 
February 2002) objectively constituted an intended offer of compromise.66
                                            
63  Par 6.  
64  At 657. 
65  Par 47. 
66  Par 12. 
 This 
reasoning is sound as the debtor was prompted to enquire about the 
countermanding of the cheque only once it received the creditor’s letter (dated 
1 March 2002). Had the creditor not sent this letter, the debtor would have had 
no reason to make any enquiries about a stop payment on the cheque. 
Therefore this evidence (that is, the debtor’s attempting to stop payment on the 
cheque) does not appear to be relevant to the debtor’s intention at the time he 
issued the cheque in favour of the creditor (in full and final settlement). On the 
contrary, if the debtor had not attempted to stop payment on the cheque, even 
if it had been possible to do so, it could have been argued in favour of the 
creditor that no attempt to stop payment was forthcoming by the debtor, 
because the debtor truly believed that it was solely/merely making payment 
towards an admitted liability. Contrary to the finding of the CPD, the court in the 
Be Bop (SCA) case was correct in that its interpretation was not unfavourable 
to the debtor for attempting to stop payment on the cheque. 
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Finally, Zeffertt notes that for an offer of compromise to exist “the proposal, 
objectively construed, must be intended to create binding legal relations and 
must have so appeared to the offeree".67 This reasoning was endorsed in both 
the Be Bop (CPD) case68 and the Be Bop (SCA) case.69 An essential part of 
Zeffertt’s reasoning is that it must appear to the creditor that an offer of 
compromise is intended.70 In this context, from the delivery of the cheque and 
the two letters dated 19 February 2002, the issue is whether or not, objectively 
construed, it appeared to the creditor that the debtor intended an offer of 
compromise. The court in the Be Bop (SCA) case correctly ruled that the 
creditor understood these three documents to constitute an intended offer of 
compromise.71 This ruling is justified as the creditor (in its letter dated 1 March 
2002) repeatedly advised the debtor that it did not accept the payment in full 
and final settlement. The only plausible reason for the creditor’s repeatedly 
emphasising this point in the same letter is that the creditor understood that the 
debtor wanted to bring finality to the entire dispute by intending to compromise 
the claim. The debtor therefore intended an offer of compromise and the same 
intention was conveyed to the mind of the creditor.72
In the light of the above submissions the court in the Be Bop (SCA) case 
correctly overruled the CPD, when the former held that an offer of compromise 
existed. In the Be Bop (CPD) case the court adopted a literal approach to the 
enquiry it formulated,
  
 
73 and once it was established that the debtors’ payment 
was consistent with the full extent of its admitted liability, the CPD easily74
                                            
67  Zeffertt, supra n 6, 38.  
68  Par 27. 
69  Par 10. 
70  See also Christie, supra n 5, 457, where the author reasons “that if the debtor cannot 
prove that the creditor ought reasonably to have interpreted the letter and cheque as an 
offer of compromise", the contra proferentem rule should apply and the creditor can then 
retain and deposit the payment and sue for the balance outstanding.  
71  Par 12; see also RCG Trade & Finance v Garstang 2002 JDR 0451 (W) 25, where it is 
explained that the creditor’s attorney understood a crucial letter from the debtor, 
accompanied with the cheque, as an offer of compromise. 
72  See also eg, Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41 (N), at 48D-E.  
73  See par 42, the enquiry formulated being “whether the offer to pay is intended as an offer 
of compromise or as an offer to pay what the debtor believes he owes the creditor".  
74  The “ease” with which the CPD reached its finding is also supplemented by the use of the 
word “simply” in the last sentence at par 45.  
 
concluded that the seller had made payment towards what it believed it was 
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owing to the creditor.75 As a result the CPD found that payment had been made 
towards an admitted liability as opposed to an offer of compromise. The 
approach of the CPD appears to be consistent with the reasoning adopted in 
the Karson case, that it is easier to conclude that payment was made towards 
an admitted liability when the debtor delivers the precise payment he believes 
he owes to the creditor.76 It is respectfully reiterated that such a conclusion is 
not always easy to reach.77
In the Karson case, in order to establish if the debtor intended to compromise 
the creditor’s claim the court had to determine whether the debtor included the 
interest amount (claimed by the creditor) in the offer that was presented to the 
creditor.
 Therefore criticism is hereby respectfully directed at 
the court in the Be Bop (CPD) case, because the evidence was overwhelming 
that an offer of compromise existed, yet it came to a different finding. On the 
contrary, the court in the Be Bop (SCA) case justifiably concluded that an offer 
of compromise existed.  
 
78 Although the debtor made it expressly clear that the offer presented 
(in full and final settlement) was for 'all' amounts due and owing for the 
purchase of the property (save for the transfer costs),79 the court did not accept 
that the interest amount was included in the debtor’s offer. Therefore the court 
concluded that an offer of compromise was not intended by the debtor.80 It is 
difficult to accept that the debtor’s cheque payment was made with the intention 
that the interest amount claimed by the creditor was not included, and remained 
in issue.81 On the contrary, the probabilities favour a finding that the debtor 
intended to settle the entire claim by paying a particular amount,82
                                            
75  Par 44-45. 
76  Par 895G-H. 
77  See the Andy’s Electrical case, (at 344B-C) and the Tractor case, where the debtor 
delivered the amount it believed it owed the creditor, yet (in both cases) the court held that 
an offer of compromise existed. See also the Van Breukelen case, at 290D; and Harris v 
Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 649 where the court envisages that an offer of compromise could 
exist even when “liability to the extent of the tender is admitted”. 
78  See par 890B. 
79  See par 891B-C.  
80  See par 896A-F. 
81  See the Andy’s Electrical case, at 344C for the approach of attempting to establish if the 
debtor intends an offer of compromise.  
82  Ibid. 
 as the offer 
was made in full and final settlement for all amounts due and owing for the 
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purchase of the property. Furthermore, this submission is justified as the 
debtor’s offer in the Karson case was in response to the creditor’s claim for 
both the interest and capital amounts owing.83 The use of the word "all" 
accompanied by the fact that the debtor made it expressly clear that the only 
amount excluded from the offer was the transfer costs means that the interest 
amount claimed was intended to be included by the debtor in his offer.84
The court in both the Karson case and the Be Bop (CPD) case appeared to 
have adopted a dismissive approach against the debtor (by too easily finding 
that no offer of compromise existed) when the debtor paid the precise amount 
he/it believed was owing to the creditor. Such an approach is in conflict with the 
approach taken in the Tractor case
  
 
85 and the Andy’s Electrical case,86
                                            
83  See par 890H-891C. 
84  See par 891B-C, where the debtor’s letter evidences that the offer was for all amounts due 
and owing and the only amount specifically excluded from the offer (relating to the 
purchase of the property) is the transfer costs. This said letter was sent to the creditor in 
response to the creditor’s letter (at par 890H-I) advising the debtor that an interest amount 
was due in addition to the capital amount. The creditor considered the interest amount to 
be “due” (par 890H), and the debtor (in response thereto) couched its offer to include “all” 
amounts that were considered “due and owing” (par 891B-C). The only amount excluded 
from the offer was the transfer costs, therefore the interest amount was considered and 
covered in the offer that was presented by the debtor to the creditor. In this context an 
offer of compromise is clearly made. See eg, in the Van Breukelen case, at 290D-E, where 
the Appellate Division reasoned that a compromise was made evidently clearer from the 
statement that the offer was made for “any” amount which might be found to be due, 
relating to the dissolution of the partnership; and RCG Trade and Finance v Garstang 
2002 JDR 0451 (W) at 24, where the court considers the use of the words “all claims” (by 
the debtor when he sought to settle the debt) to be crucial when it concluded that an offer 
of compromise was intended, “and not merely the evidence of an intention to pay".  
85  See par 743A-E.  
86  See par 343F-344C, especially where Didcott J bluntly criticises judgments that 
simplistically distinguish “offers of compromise from payments of admitted debts, as if the 
one sort of transaction necessarily excluded the other". In the Karson case and the Be Bop 
(CPD) case, by easily finding that an offer of compromise did not exist, it appears (based 
on the facts) that once the court in both cases found that payment was made towards an 
admitted debt, it failed to consider if the said payment of the admitted debt was 
accompanied by an offer of compromise (see at par 344B-C, the comment relating to 
Zeffertt). This submission is made as it has been argued in this discussion that an offer of 
compromise existed in both the Karson case and the Be Bop (CPD) case.  
 which 
clearly gives recognition and due application to the principle that such conduct 
by a debtor does not preclude the probability that an offer of compromise could 
nevertheless still be accompanied by the precise admission of liability. The 
approach adopted by the latter two jurisdictions and now the SCA, in the Be 
Bop (SCA) case, is certainly correct and consistent with the reasoning of the 
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Appellate Division87 in the Van Breukelen case,88
5 Acceptance of offer 
 that admission (by the 
debtor) of an amount due to the creditor is not decisive that an offer of 
compromise is excluded.  
 
 
To consider whether or not acceptance has been established it is assumed that 
an offer of compromise exists. Otherwise it is not necessary to proceed with the 
‘acceptance’ enquiry.  
 
In the Be Bop (CPD) case, after receiving the cheque the creditor made it 
expressly clear to the debtor (in writing), that it unequivocally rejected the 
cheque as payment for the full and final settlement of the creditor’s claim, and 
invited the debtor (if it disagreed with this stance) to stop payment on the 
cheque.89 The court in the Be Bop (CPD) case held that this conduct was not 
compatible with acceptance of an offer of compromise.90 Acceptance of an offer 
must usually be clear and unequivocal/unambiguous such that a reasonable 
person would interpret it as an acceptance.91
Since the creditor in the Be Bop (SCA) case appeared to have rejected the 
offer in writing,
  
 
92 prima facie it seems that the parties were not ad idem. 
Therefore no contractual obligations would automatically arise. However, 
consideration must be given as to whether or not the act of retention of the 
monies might constitute an acceptance by conduct.93
                                            
87  Hereafter the AD. 
88  See par 290D; Also see Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, at 648-649. 
89  Par 10. 
90  Par 46. 
91  See eg, Boerne v Harris 1949 1 SA 793 (A); Van Jaarsveld v Ackerman 1975 2 SA 753 
(A); Kahn v Raatz 1976 4 SA 543 (A); Christie, supra n 5, 60-62; and Sharrock, supra n 5, 
62.  
92  See par 5, where the creditor reiterates that the payment is not accepted in full and final 
settlement of the account. 
93  See eg, Zeffertt, supra n 6, 38. 
 Furthermore, it is trite that 
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the offeror can impliedly94 or expressly95 indicate the method of acceptance 
(which includes relieving the offeree from communicating his acceptance),96 
and where the interpretative effect of the offer is that the payment may be 
retained only upon acceptance of the condition that the debtor’s whole liability 
is discharged, then retention of the monies will generally constitute acceptance 
of the offer of compromise.97 The same consequence follows if a reasonable 
person in the circumstances would interpret the retention of the payment to 
signify acceptance.98 These principles are justifiably applicable, as a creditor 
who expressly rejects an offer of compromise must as a natural consequence 
return the debtor’s payment.99 It is therefore understandable that the retention 
and/or appropriation and/or depositing of the debtor’s payment, accompanied 
with an express rejection of the offer of compromise, (on the part of the 
creditor) generally100 constitutes acceptance of the offer of compromise.101 This 
logically follows, as the “creditor is not allowed to approbate and reprobate at 
the same time".102 However, it should be noted (and it has already been 
discussed)103
In the Be Bop (SCA) case, the issue is whether the retention (depositing and 
subsequent partial appropriation) of the debtor’s cheque payment constitutes 
acceptance of the offer, (which would be consistent with the general 
 that if an offer of compromise is not established, the creditor can 
retain the payment and sue for the balance owing by the debtor. 
 
                                            
94  Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41(N) 48D-E; and Malan and Pretorius Bills of 
Exchange 327. 
95  The Van Breukelen case, at 289; Blumberg v Atkinson 1974 4 SA 551 (T) 554; Malan and 
Pretorius, supra n 94, 327.  
96  Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41(N) 50H-51A; Christie, supra n 5, 457; and 
Zeffertt, supra n 6, 38-39. 
97  Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41(N) 50H-51A.  
98  See eg, Zeffertt, supra n 6, 38. 
99  See eg, Harris v Pieters 1920 AD 644, 650; Neville v Plasket 1935 TPD 115, 120; Turgin v 
Atlantic Clothing Manufacturers 1954 3 SA 527 (T) 533; and Blumberg v Atkinson 1974 4 
SA 551 (T) 553H-554A.  
100  See McLennan, supra n 13, 686, where the author explains that this is not an absolute rule 
that provides conclusive proof of acceptance of the offer.  
101  See eg, Neville v Plasket 1935 TPD 115, 120; Turgin v Atlantic Clothing Manufacturers 
1954 3 SA 527 (T) 532G-H; the Van Breukelen case, 288A and 290H; the Tractor case; 
Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41(N) 48H-51A; the Andy’s Electrical case, 
343A-C; Kei Brick & Tile v AM Construction 1996 1 SA 150 (E) 152I-153B; and Absa Bank 
v Van De Vyver 2002 4 SA 397 (SCA) 402B-F. 
102  Turgin v Atlantic Clothing Manufacturers 1954 3 SA 527 (T) 532. 
103 See discussion under par 2.1 above. 
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interpretation of our judiciary), or whether the circumstances justify a deviation 
from the general interpretation. The case of Burt v National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd104 serves as a deviation from the general interpretation,105 because 
the creditor (after rejecting the offer) returned the debtor’s money (with it’s own 
cheque), which the debtor rejected. Thereafter the creditor placed the funds in 
a trust account for the benefit of the debtor to request at any time. In the Be 
Bop (SCA) case the creditor did not return the cheque payment and whilst the 
money was placed in a trust account (of the creditor’s attorneys) it was clearly 
not available at the debtor’s disposal to request it at any time.106 Instead, at 
some point a portion of these funds were appropriated for the benefit of the 
creditor.107
                                            
104  Burt v National Bank of South Africa 1921 AD 59 65-66. 
105  For a deviation from the general interpretation, see also eg, Patterson Exhibitions v 
Knights Advertising & Marketing 1991 3 SA 397 (A), where the debtor made an offer of 
compromise, which included payment in the form of a current cheque and five post-dated 
cheques. The creditor deposited the current cheque and expressly rejected the offer of 
compromise. Despite the creditor’s depositing the current cheque and retaining the post-
dated cheques, the court held that the offer of compromise was rejected, and that an 
agreement of compromise was therefore not concluded. This is not applicable to the Be 
Bop (SCA) case, as it was reasoned by the SCA in the Absa Bank case (at par 9), that the 
Patterson Exhibitions v Knights Advertising & Marketing 1991 3 SA 397 (A) case is not 
applicable where “there was a simple offer of one cheque the proceeds of which were 
retained". For a view rejecting the decision in Patterson Exhibitions v Knights Advertising & 
Marketing 1991 3 SA 397 (AD), see RCG Trade & Finance v Garstang 2002 JDR 0451 
(W) at 27-30. Without commenting on the merits of the judgment in the former case, it is 
accepted, based on the doctrine of judicial precedent (see the Absa Bank case at par 9), 
that this judgment is not applicable to the Be Bop (SCA) case; See also McLennan, supra 
n 13, 686-689, wherein it is argued that the Absa Bank case should have been viewed as 
a deviation from the usual interpretation, as the author argues that the banking of the 
cheque did not constitute proof of acceptance of the debtor’s offer of compromise. See 
also Steenkamp v Union Government 1947 1 SA 449 (C) and Blackie Swart Argitekte v 
Van Heerden 1986 1 SA 249 (A), where it was held in the former case that the employee 
of the creditor, who had deposited the cheque payment, did not have authority to 
compromise the claim, and in the latter case, the court held that the creditor’s attorney or 
the creditor’s attorney’s secretary (who deposited the cheque payment) did not have 
authority to compromise the creditor’s claim. Therefore in both cases it was held that the 
offer of compromise was not accepted. In the Be Bop (SCA) case (at par 14, referring to n 
13 in that judgment), it was reasoned that it was not necessary to decide if the employee 
of the creditor who deposited the cheque payment, lacked authority to compromise the 
creditor’s claim, as it was not raised as an issue of contention before the SCA. However, if 
this issue had been raised it would probably have been addressed in the light of the 
principles relating to estoppel.  
106  See par 5 and par 14. 
107  Par 2 and par 14. 
 Therefore, the circumstances in this case did not justify a deviation 
from the general interpretation of our judiciary.  
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Furthermore, the AD has made it categorically clear that when an offer of 
compromise is rejected the creditor is obliged to return the debtor’s payment 
and the debtor’s legal position is not affected if he fails to request the return of 
the payment.108 At times our judiciary has held that the retention of the 
monetary payment (from the debtor) without any offer to return it must be held 
to constitute acceptance of the offer of compromise.109
In reaching this finding the court reasoned that although actual consensus may 
have been lacking between the parties, the debtor’s belief was reasonable that 
the creditor was accepting the offer of compromise.
  
 
The court in the Be Bop (SCA) case therefore reached the correct finding that 
the depositing, retention and subsequent appropriation of a portion of the 
debtor’s payment in favour of the creditor concluded an agreement of 
compromise between both parties. However, the method utilised to reach its 
finding invites further discussion. 
 
110 In this context, the court 
in the Be Bop (SCA) case utilised the reliance theory to justify its finding. In 
terms of this theory, even if a person (A) does not intend to be bound by a 
contract, he (A) will be bound by that contract if he, by his conduct or words, led 
the other contracting person (B), reasonably to believe that he (A) intended to 
be bound by the contract and the terms contained therein.111
In the context of the reliance theory, the issue in the Be Bop (SCA) case is 
whether the debtor’s belief was reasonable that the creditor accepted the offer 
of compromise. The SCA held that the debtor’s belief was reasonable, and 
therefore that an agreement of compromise was concluded. The issue that 
arises is to question whether or not the debtor’s belief was reasonable (that the 
creditor accepted it’s offer of compromise), as the creditor (in it’s letter dated 1 
  
 
                                            
108  Patterson Exhibitions v Knights Advertising & Marketing 1991 3 SA 397 (A) 528G-H. 
109  See eg, Neville v Plasket 1935 TPD 115, 120; and Turgin v Atlantic Clothing 
Manufacturers 1954 3 SA 527 (T) 533. However, exceptions do apply (see n 104 and n 
105 in general).  
110  See the Be Bop (SCA) case, at par 14. 
111 See eg, Sonap Petroleum (SA) v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A); Steyn v LSA Motors 
1994 1 SA 49 (A); and Constantia Insurance v Compusource 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA). 
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March 2002) repeatedly advised the debtor that it’s payment was not accepted 
in full and final settlement and it invited the debtor to stop payment on the 
cheque if the debtor disagreed with the creditor’s stance.112 The debtor was 
further advised by the creditor’s attorneys (in its letter dated 7 March 2002) that 
it would place the money received in its trust account and issue summons for 
the full amount owing.113 Notwithstanding these facts, it appears that the 
depositing, retention and subsequent partial appropriation of the proceeds from 
the payment persuaded the SCA to find that such conduct on the part of the 
creditor led the debtor to reasonably believe that an agreement of compromise 
was concluded.114 However, Sharrock reasons that the reliance theory will not 
be applicable, where the party wishing to assert the contract is exposed to the 
possibility that more than one reasonable conclusion exists and it is not 
possible for the court to favour either of the conclusions as the more 
reasonable.115 In other words, if it can be reasonably inferred on the one hand 
that the creditor expressly rejects the offer of compromise, whilst on the other 
hand it can also be reasonably inferred from the depositing, retention and 
appropriation of the proceeds from the cheque that the creditor accepts the 
offer of compromise, then the debtor may not necessarily hold the creditor to 
the latter interpretation, if the creditor intends the former interpretation.116
                                            
112  Par 5. 
113  Par 7. 
114  See par 14. In deciding whether or not the debtor’s belief was reasonable, it should also 
be noted that the debtor responded to what the SCA referred to as the creditor’s purported 
rejection, and advised the creditor (in the letter dated 4 March 2002) that the debtor 
understood the creditor’s action of depositing the cheque on 28 February 2002 to 
constitute acceptance of the condition that payment was made in full and final settlement 
(see par 6).  
115  Sharrock, supra n 5, 77. 
116  See eg, Diamond v Kernick 1947 3 SA 69 (A). 
 In this 
context, in the Be Bop (SCA) case the creditor’s express rejection of the offer of 
compromise (and its invitation to the debtor to stop payment on the cheque, 
accompanied by the warning of it’s intended course to issue summons for the 
whole amount owing) potentially creates more than one reasonable 
interpretation which the debtor was exposed to. Use of the reliance theory 
therefore becomes contentious. Unfortunately, the SCA did not address this 
issue directly and it is therefore respectfully submitted that it will be necessary 
for our judiciary to do so in the future so that principles are established when 
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applying the reliance theory to establish if an agreement of compromise has 
been concluded.  
 
If the applicability of the reliance theory is questionable in the Be Bop (SCA) 
case, was there a more appropriate approach available to assist the SCA to 
reach a finding that is consistent with the general interpretation of our judiciary 
in the past?117 This question may be answered in the affirmative. It has already 
been explained that the debtor has the right to determine the mode of 
acceptance (which includes relieving the creditor from communicating its 
acceptance).118 In this case the SCA (by its own interpretation of the facts) 
justifiably found that the cheque, together with both of the letters addressed by 
the debtor to the creditor, “formed part of the offer and amounts to an invitation 
to deposit the cheque to indicate its acceptance".119 The creditor was therefore 
relieved of communicating its acceptance, and the depositing of the cheque 
(into the creditor’s bank account) complied with the mode of acceptance 
impliedly indicated by the debtor.120 In this context, any conditions attached to 
the acceptance (like the creditor’s purported rejection of the offer of 
compromise in its letter dated 1 March 2002) are irrelevant and 
unenforceable,121
6 Conclusion 
 and the subsequent partial appropriation of the proceeds 
from the cheque confirms the creditor’s acceptance. 
 
 
The court in the Be Bop (SCA) case came to the correct finding that an offer of 
compromise existed. Whilst the judgment is brief, the finding itself gives 
                                            
117  In this context the general interpretation of our judiciary would favour a finding that the 
creditor’s depositing, retention and subsequent partial appropriation of the proceeds from 
the cheque payment constitutes acceptance of the offer of compromise. See eg all the 
references in n 101. 
118  See references in n 94, n 95 and n 96.  
119  See the Be Bop (SCA) case, at par 12. 
120  See eg, Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41(N) at par 48D-E and par 50H-51A; 
and Malan and Pretorius, supra n 94, 327. 
121  See eg, the references in n 13 and n 14. Also note that the court in the Be Bop (SCA) case 
refers to the creditor’s letter (dated 1 March 2002) as a purported (at par 2 and par 12) 
rejection of the debtor’s offer.  
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practical recognition to the principle that admission of liability for a specific 
amount, accompanied by payment (in full and final settlement), may still be 
accompanied by an intended offer of compromise, instead of merely making 
payment towards an admission of liability.  
 
Given that the trial court and the full bench of the CPD came to an incorrect 
finding, our judiciary should in future be more cautious in their approach to 
disputes of this nature. Our judiciary should approach these disputes (in the 
specific context that this case discussion alludes to) from the premise that 
payment of an admitted debt for a specific amount can be accompanied by an 
offer of compromise.122 This approach should respectfully be preferred over the 
approach alluded to in the Karson case, wherein the court addressed the issue 
from the premise that it is easier to reach a conclusion that payment towards an 
admitted liability is intended where the payment made is consistent with the 
precise amount the debtor believes he owes the creditor.123 The court in the Be 
Bop (CPD) case appeared to have adopted the approach taken in the Karson 
case. This submission is made as it is difficult to understand how the CPD 
easily124 came to the incorrect finding when the facts clearly indicated that an 
offer of compromise existed. However, the concern remains whether this ruling 
of the SCA125
Finally, on the issue of whether or not acceptance of the offer of compromise 
was established in the Be Bop (SCA) case, it appears that the depositing of the 
cheque into the creditor’s account was sufficient to constitute acceptance of the 
 will in future assist our judiciary in their approach to disputes of 
this nature, or whether the pattern of interpretative inconsistency will continue.  
 
                                            
122  See eg, the Andy’s Electrical case, at 343F-344C; the Tractor case, at 743A; the Van 
Breukelen case, at par 290D; and Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41(N), at 
46C-D, where Kenedy J (in the context of payments made in full settlement) reasons that 
the premise should be that an offer of compromise exists, where liability to the extent of 
the tender has been admitted, and this reasoning should only change if the evidence or 
surrounding circumstances indicates the contrary.  
123  See the Karson case, at par 895G-H. 
124 In this regard consider the use of the word “simply” at par 45, in the Be Bop (CPD) case, 
and also see (at par 44 and par 45) how the said court easily reaches the incorrect finding, 
once it was established that the debtor’s payment was consistent with its admitted 
indebtedness.  
125 The Be Bop (SCA) case. 
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offer of compromise, as it was necessarily implied that the depositing of the 
cheque will constitute acceptance of the offer of compromise.126 The 
subsequent partial appropriation of the proceeds from the cheque confirms 
such acceptance. This line of reasoning is consistent with the general 
interpretation favoured by our judiciary in the past.127
                                            
126 See the Be Bop (SCA) case, at par 12. Also see eg, Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 
SA 41(N), at par 48D-E and par 50H-51A; and Malan and Pretorius, supra n 94, 327.  
127  See eg, Cecil Jacobs v Mcleod & Sons 1966 4 SA 41(N), at par 48D-E and par 50H-51A; 
and see all the references in n 101. 
 However, in this case, the 
SCA sought to introduce the reliance theory as a basis to find that an 
agreement of compromise was concluded. As argued above, introducing the 
reliance theory into this arena (relating to whether an agreement of compromise 
is concluded) has its difficulties. Whether these difficulties are insurmountable 
or not will have to be addressed by our judiciary on a case by case basis. This 
submission is made so that principles may be established to reconcile how a 
debtor’s belief that the creditor has accepted his offer of compromise is 
reasonable, when the creditor expressly iterates to the debtor that the offer is 
not accepted in full and final settlement. Regarding the acceptance issue, 
where the content of the creditor’s correspondence to the debtor is ambiguous 
in that the creditor stipulates that he has deposited and appropriated the 
proceeds of the debtor’s payment, but that he does not accept the payment in 
full and final settlement, consideration may be given in the future to the 
applicability of the contra proferentem rule to be interpreted against the creditor. 
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